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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 14/07/2011 Accident number: 438 
Accident time: 13:20 Accident Date: 19/02/2006 




Country: Sri Lanka 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: 20/02/2006 
ID original source: None Name of source: Demining group 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: P4 AP blast Fuze Ground condition: not applicable 
Date record created: 16/03/2007 Date  last modified: 14/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: SL Grid 0113885 
0507031 
Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate communications (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
The demining group made their internal investigation available in 2011. Its conversion into a 
DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is 
editorial. This record will be revised if more information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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File date: 20.02.2006 
INVESTIGATION REPORT OF DEMINING ACCIDENT IN JAFFNA 19 FEBRUARY 2006 
Summary 
Accident date:19th February 2003, Time:13:20 
Location: Mine collection point in minefield LK-241, SL Grid 0113885 0507031, Periyavillan, 
Valikamam Southwest, Jaffna 
Event: P4 MK1 booster blast in the hands of the team leader 
Casualty: [the Victim] [Demining group] ID No 170, Position: Demining team leader 
Organisation: [Demining Group] 
  
Introduction 
This report covers the findings of an internal investigation into the circumstances and events 
of an accident to a team leader, [the Victim] who was carrying out mine clearance duties with 
[Demining Group] in Jaffna District on the 19th February 2006. 
History of the Minefield 
The minefield LK-241 is a defensive barrier laid by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) some time 
during 1993. The mines were laid in accordance with methodology employed widely by SLA 
Engineers throughout Sri Lanka protecting a Forward Defence Line (FDL). Most of the terrain 
is open ground with few trees and bushes. The mine type laid into the minefield is Pakistan 
P4 MK1 type antipersonnel mine. 
Some demining has taken place by untrained independent local labour. According to the 
survey information ([Demining group] minefield report LK-241, task ID JA-11), the local labour 
removed and destroyed 50 mines in the past from the area. During their clearance process, 
an accident occurred to one of the local labour. Further, 5 bulls have stepped on a mine in the 
minefield. The [Demining group] had been carrying out mine clearance activities for 2 months 
on this task when the accident occurred. 
Details of the Accident 
On 19th February 2006 at 13:20 hours, team leader [the Victim] was carrying out an inventory 
of found boosters of P4 MK1 antipersonnel mines in a mine collection point located in the 
minefield LK-241, in Periyavillan village. He had started the work day normally at 08:00 and 
ever since worked 50 min at a time following a ten minute break and had a 30 min breakfast 
break in the minefield as well. 
Already in the morning start up, together with the team members he discovered new piles of 
emptied shells of the P4 antipersonnel mines and boosters lying on the ground in the 
minefield, abandoned to the area by an unknown person. The bodies of the antipersonnel 
mines were emptied from explosive content but the separate bottom plates of the mines still 
contained the explosive booster button attached to them. Team leader [the Victim] ordered 
the section leaders to collect the boosters carefully into plastic buckets from the cleared lanes 
of the minefield and transport them to the mine collection point. 
Altogether 75 boosters were collected from these piles during the work day and moved to the 
mine collection point. At 13:20 hours, he was counting the total amount of the found P4 
boosters before being transported away from the minefield, to be later disposed in a central 
demolition site. While handling one of the P4 boosters, it exploded in his hands. 
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The explosion caused injuries to his left hand and right hand fingers and to the top of his left 
eye. The team members heard the explosion and the emergency whistle blast by the section 
leaders. The paramedics arrived to the minefield in a minute and gave first aid to [the Victim]. 
The operational headquarters was informed about the accident. The medical procedure 
continued with an evacuation by an ambulance to the Jaffna Teaching Hospital according to 
the [Demining group] standing operating procedures. 
In the hospital, a doctor conducted a full medical examination, treated minor injuries in his 
face and X-ray photos were taken. At 16:30 hours, the Victim]’s hands were operated. 
Demining Site 
In the internal investigation, the demining site was found well laid and marked in accordance 
with the [Demining group] SOP. The site was non-operational in the late afternoon of the 
inspection and therefore the tools, personal protective equipment and recovered explosive 
accessories had been removed from the accident location. 
As anticipated, there was no crater caused by the blast in the mine collection point due to the 
small explosive content and the fact that the explosion occurred in the hands of the team 
leader. Altogether four piles of abandoned emptied plastic bodies of the landmines were 
witnessed on site, containing approximately remains of 200 P4 MK1 antipersonnel mines. The 
boosters with yet explosive content, had been transported by the demining team from the site 
away to the [Demining group] mine store. 
[Demining group] will leave the investigation of this unauthorized and dangerous, private 
disarming project to the police. There are rumours of an unknown young person appearing to 
the area after [Demining group] demining team is not present on site, and by using a small 
mammothy [sic], the stranger removes antipersonnel mines and removes explosives from 
them. [Demining group] has handed out a report to the police in the issue. 
Personal Protective Equipment 
It is a standard practise in the [Demining group] to wear personal protective equipment whilst 
operating in the mined area. At the time of the incident, the injured team leader was wearing 
standard uniform trousers and shirt, leather canvas boots and a fragmentation vest. The team 
leader indeed was found not wearing a visor. The team leader experienced minor injuries to 
his head and injuries to his hands. There is not protective gear to safeguard the hands of the 
demining personnel in use in the demining. Furthermore, it is advised not to wear gloves 
when handling landmines, to ensure a firm and yet gentle grip of the device in hand, in order 
to not drop it during handling. 
Training and Experience of Personnel 
The responsibilities of [Demining group] demining personnel are clearly outlined in [Demining 
group] SOP for Sri Lanka. Team Leader [the Victim] was trained as a deminer in October 
2003 and has been given bi-annual refresh training sessions until the present day. He has 
operated as a section leader from July 2004 and as a team leader March 2005. He is an 
experienced deminer and a leader. 
Medical Support 
The [Demining group] methodology detailed in Sri Lankan SOP calls for at least one trained 
paramedic working on the site to be able to provide first aid. In this case, there were two 
paramedics and an ambulance ready and waiting with a designated driver. The level of 
medical support and evacuation available on the day of the accident was appropriate to the 
needs and was in accordance with the SOP. 
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Contributing Factors of the Accident 
1. [Demining group] SOP 
The internal investigating team finds that the methodology detailed in [Demining group] SOP 
did not contribute to the accident. 
2. Application of SOP by the team leader involved 
It is the opinion of the internal investigating team that the application of the SOP by the injured 
team leader, did not contribute to the accident. However, by wearing a visor according to the 
SOP, occurred facial injuries might have been avoided. 
3. Command and control structure 
The structure was found to be in order and in line with the SOP. The communication from the 
field to the operational headquarters was appropriate and accurate, however the investigating 
team did not witness a phone call taken to the Jaffna Teaching Hospital prior the 
transportation of the injured team leader. The experienced delay in taking an X-ray photo 
before the operation, might have been avoided by calling the hospital emergency already 
from the minefield or during the evacuation. According to the doctor however, the lack of prior 
communication between the paramedics and the hospital personnel did not affect the 
treatment. 
4. Environmental conditions 
There is evidence to suggest that environmental conditions were a contributing factor to the 
accident, such as: 
The unauthorized and untrained person(s) have removed landmines in the area, possibly 
applying a rough removal method (a mammothy). A rough removal of the antipersonnel mine 
itself may damage the booster and thereby make it more sensitive. 
If the internal components of the mine are damaged prior or during the demining process, 
mine can function in an unpredicted way. 
If the pressurized spring and firing pin have unsuccessfully functioned and are thereby 
leaning against the explosive button prior to unscrewing the booster, unscrewing it will 
damage the booster. 
Trails of seemingly violent disarming technique of the landmines was witnessed on site. The 
disarming was carried out by unscrewing the booster from the bottom and cutting the 
pressure plate off by knife to separate the top and bottom parts of the mine body in order to 
remove the explosives. 
Abandoning the remaining parts of the landmines by throwing them away to the minefield 
under a direct sunlight. Exposing the booster to a direct sunlight, will have an effect on the 
booster by heating it up and in theory, make it more sensitive. 
Conclusions  
The cause of the explosion is unknown. The booster was finally initiated by the hand of the 
team leader. There is no evidence nor there is a reason in vicinity, why that handling would 
have been rough. It is common knowledge within the demining team leaders, that the 
explosive content in the small booster button, is more sensitive than the one used in the body 
of the mine; in fact it is called an initiation charge in the training. However, a normal handling 
of the booster should not be dangerous at all. 
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One or many of the environmental conditions mentioned above, may have caused the booster 
explosion.  
Internal Investigation Team, Jaffna 20.02.2006 
Signed [Name removed] Operations Manager, [Name removed] Internal Quality Assurance 
Officer 
 
Attachments: [held on file] 
Annex A: Map of the accident location 
Annex B: Photos of injured team leader [showing fragment injuries on the left eyelid, right 
cheek, left upper lip and chin. See medecial report.] 
Annex C: Statement by the injured team leader  
Annex D: Photos of disarmed antipersonnel mine plastic bodies 
Annex E: Medical Report page 1 
Annex F: Medical Report page 2 
Annex G: P4 MK1 AP mine: Exerpt from Jane’s Mines 2002 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 585 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Face; severe Hands 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Fingers  
COMMENT: See Medical Report 
 
Medical report 
 “…injuries to his left hand and right hand fingers [hands required surgery] and to the top of 
his left eye”. 
A medical report included the note:  
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The primary cause of this accident is listed as Unavoidable because the investigators found 
that the Victim was working correctly t approved SOPs and that the detonation was most 
likely caused by unpredictable damage to the fuze rather than inappropriate handling. 
However, the Victim was not wearing a visor and as a field supervisor it was his responsibility 
to set a good example, so the secondary cause is listed as  a Field Control Inadequacy 
because the Victim was not wearing the required PPE. 
The demining group’s internal investigation appears to show a professional desire to be 
objective which is appreciated, and the quality of the report is unusual for Sri Lanka, where 
detailed accident reports are rare. 
 
6 
